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An industry exhibits network externalities when the beneﬁt that consumers enjoy from
purchasing one or several of its goods depends on the number of other consumers that use
the same and/or compatible products. For the ﬁrms in those sectors (e.g. telecommunica-
tions, consumer electronics, operating systems, etc.), the presence of network externalities
implies that the attractiveness of their products is a function of their quality-adjusted
prices and the potential beneﬁt attached to their expected network sizes.
Several studies have shown how pricing considerations, as well as compatibility, entry
and investment decisions are aﬀected by the presence of network externalities. Moreover,
due to the presence of these externalities, ﬁrms in network industries might even follow
very diﬀerent rules from those observed in traditional industries. While the producer
of a new product in a conventional industry tends to place it on the market early, to
diﬀerentiate the good as much as possible, to protect it from imitation and to charge high
prices, successful producers of network goods have often done the opposite.
This paper analyzes how network externalities inﬂuence industry Research and De-
velopment (R&D) incentives when two network technologies compete. The paper focuses
on the levels of R&D investments, the social eﬃciency of those eﬀorts and the role of
networks’ compatibility.
The paper presents four main results. First, for low cost of innovation entry does not
occur at all and for high cost of innovation, entry occurs with positive probability. Low
cost of innovation implies that through investments the incumbent ﬁrm is able to preempt
the entrant. Second, when entry is possible, the incumbent invests always more than
the entrant and, therefore, there is a high probability that the incumbent maintains its
monopoly position. This result implies that, even though the incumbent has an advantage
to keep monopolizing the market, he is forced to innovate given the threat of entry. Third,
from a welfare perspective, the incumbent invests too little and the entrant invests too
much given the existence of locked-in consumers. These results are solely due to the
presence of network externalities. Fourth, by choosing to produce compatible products,
ﬁrms do not necessarily reduce the R&D competition intensity as has been suggested in





This paper analyzes the impact of network externalities on R&D competition be-
tween an incumbent and a potential entrant. The analysis shows that the incumbent
always invests more than the entrant in the development of higher quality network
goods. However, the incumbent exhibits a too low level of investments, while the
entrant invests too much in R&D in comparison with the social optimum. In the
model entry occurs too often in equilibrium. These ineﬃciencies are solely due to
the presence of network externalities. By choosing compatible network goods, ﬁrms
do not necessarily reduce the R&D competition intensity.
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An industry exhibits network externalities when the beneﬁt that consumers enjoy from
purchasing one or several of its goods depends on the number of other consumers that use
the same and/or compatible products. For the ﬁrms in those sectors (e.g. telecommunica-
tions, consumer electronics, operating systems, etc.), the presence of network externalities
implies that the attractiveness of their products is a function of their quality-adjusted
prices and the potential beneﬁt attached to their expected network sizes (i.e. installed
bases).1
Several studies have shown how pricing considerations, as well as compatibility, entry
and investment decisions are aﬀected by the presence of network externalities.2 Moreover,
due to the presence of these externalities, ﬁrms in network industries might even follow
very diﬀerent rules from those observed in traditional industries.3
This paper analyzes how network externalities inﬂuence industry Research and De-
velopment (R&D) incentives when two network technologies compete. The paper focuses
on the levels of R&D investments, the social eﬃciency of those eﬀorts and the role of
networks’ compatibility.
Rapid technological progress derived from R&D competition is a common observation
in many industries with network externalities. Technological innovations allow rivalling
ﬁrms to introduce new products like interactive TV, Digital Versatile Disk (DVD), and
digital imaging. In nascent industries, extensive investments in R&D are usually required
to introduce new standards or dominant designs.
However, the literature on R&D and technology choice in industries that exhibit net-
work externalities is still in its early stage of development. The existing literature, in its
great majority, takes the process of R&D as exogenously given and analyzes the condi-
tions under which a new innovation is adopted (Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986), Katz
1Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986) present the seminal treatments,
and Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Economides (1996) present excellent surveys on network markets.
2See, for example, Gabel (1991), Besen and Farrell (1994), Katz and Shapiro (1994), Grindley (1995)
and Shapiro and Varian (1999) for general analyses of the impact of network externalities on ﬁrms’
strategies.
3While the producer of a new product in a conventional industry tends to place it on the market early,
to diﬀerentiate the good as much as possible, to protect it from imitation and to charge high prices,
successful producers of network goods have often done the exact opposite. See Grindley (1995).
3and Shapiro (1986, 1992), De Bijil and Goyal (1995), Shy (1996), Fudenberg and Tirole
(2000), among others). Moreover, most of the work devoted to the analysis of adoption of
new technologies with network externalities considers situations where the entrant arrives
with a (exogenously given) new technology, without considering a strategic response by
the incumbent to the threat of entry.4
This paper proposes a simpliﬁed two-period duopoly model of competition with uncer-
tain technological progress, in order to determine the private incentives to invest in R&D.
The model is simple enough to be able to isolate the main forces behind the incentives
to innovate and the role of network externalities. Speciﬁcally, we consider an incumbent
ﬁrm with an installed base and a potential entrant that challenges the incumbent only
once. We assume a uncertain technological progress. In particular, by investing in R&D
before price competition takes place, each ﬁrm can inﬂuence the probability of developing
a better technology to compete with.
We also consider the social incentives to innovate and compare the results with the
market outcome. We show the conditions under which potential ineﬃciencies arise and
propose, with our model, an explanation to these ineﬃciencies. Finally, we consider the
role of compatibility choice and its impact on the R&D incentives.
We present four main results. First, for low cost of innovation entry does not occur
at all and for high cost of innovation, entry occurs with positive probability. Low cost
of innovation implies that through investments the incumbent ﬁrm is able to preempt
the entrant. Second, when entry is possible, the incumbent invests always more that
the entrant and, therefore, there is a high probability that the incumbent maintains its
monopoly position. This result implies that, even though the incumbent has an advantage
to keep monopolizing the market, he is forced to innovate given the threat of entry.
Third, from a welfare perspective, the incumbent invests too little and the entrant invests
too much given the existence of locked-in consumers. These results are solely due to
the presence of network externalities and are in contrast with the results reported in
Kristiansen (1996). Fourth, by choosing to produce compatible products, ﬁrms do not
necessarily reduce the R&D competition intensity as has been suggested for example in
Katz and Ordover (1990) and Kristiansen (1998). Moreover, for high cost of innovation
4Some exceptions that will be discussed below include Kristiansen (1996, 1998).
4compatibility may even increase the pace of innovation observed in the industry.
Even though our model is related to the literature on network externalities, the model-
ing strategy, as well as some results, diﬀer with existing analyses. For instance, Kristiansen
(1996) also analyzes endogenous and uncertain technological process in a network indus-
try. He presents a model to describe how ﬁrms, an incumbent and a potential entrant,
choose among diﬀerent R&D projects to develop a new incompatible technology. In par-
ticular, he discusses the ﬁrms’ choices of R&D projects in terms of the risk associated
to each of them. To isolate the role of the riskiness of such projects, Kristiansen (1996)
assumes a mean-preserving spread criterion in the R&D technology. That is, even though
riskier projects exhibit higher returns and lower probability of success, the expected value
of all R&D projects is the same.
Particularly, he ﬁnds that from a social welfare point of view, the incumbent chooses
a too risky and the entrant a too certain R&D project. This ineﬃciency arises because
of the existence of an installed base of locked-in consumers of the incumbent’s technology
that is not taken into account when the ﬁrms decide on the R&D projects. The entrant
chooses a too low risk project because it exhibits a high probability of success (i.e. en-
try) but, if successful, his R&D project provides a too low value for the society. The
incumbent chooses a too risky project because, if successful, it can extract high consumer
surplus. However, his choice does not internalize the potential welfare loss of the locked-in
consumers in the case of successful entry by a ﬁrm with an incompatible technology.
As in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987), Kristiansen (1996) adopts the additional assump-
tion that riskier R&D projects entail unambiguously higher costs of development. Al-
though plausible, this assumption implies for his results that the incumbent ﬁrm invests
too much and the entrant ﬁrm too little in comparison with the social optimum. We be-
lieve that in network industries the opposite phenomenon is commonly observed. Namely,
entrants usually tend to heavily (over) invest in R&D in order to introduce new network
incompatible technologies (e.g. interactive TV, Compact Disk (CD), Digital Versatile
Disk (DVD), and digital imaging). We propose a model where this is the case. In addi-
tion, Kristiansen (1996) shows, as in our model, that the diﬀerences between private and
socially optimal R&D initiatives are due to the presence of network externalities.
In a similar paper, Choi (1994) studies an entrant’s choice among R&D projects with
5diﬀerent risks in a two period model in which consumer can delay adoption. As in Kris-
tiansen (1996), Choi (1994) also considers the case of mean-preserving spread criterion in
the R&D technology. In his model, the quality of the incumbent technology is constant
over the two periods, while the entrant’s technology evolves stochastically. By choosing a
level of risk, the entrant ﬁrm may aﬀect the distribution of the quality of its good to be
introduced in the second period. Two buyers enter sequentially in each period. The ﬁrst
buyer can observe the R&D project (i.e. risk choice) of the potential entrant and may
decide to wait until the second period to make a purchase. Choi (1994) concludes that
the ﬁrst buyer may adopt a technology too early in relation with the social optimum. In
addition, similar to Kristiansen (1996), the paper shows that the potential entrant chooses
a low level of risk in comparison with the level that maximizes social welfare. However,
Choi (1994) does not consider the costs associated with the selection of the R&D projects,
which are an important dimension of the incentives to innovate. We also depart from his
work by considering the strategic role of the R&D decision by the incumbent ﬁrm.
In a more recent work, Kristiansen (1998) studies the decisions of entry and compat-
ibility in a duopoly market in the presence of network externalities. R&D incentives are
endogenous in the sense that an earlier entry decision imply higher costs. However, this
extra cost does not aﬀect the probability distribution of the quality of the network goods
and represents more closely a sunk entry cost rather than a uncertain R&D investment.
Kristiansen (1998) shows that when the ﬁrms choose to produce compatible goods, it is
optimal for them to introduce their goods later, and therefore compatibility reduces the
R&D competition intensity observed by the two ﬁrms. We present the opposite result in
a model where investments in R&D do aﬀect the probability distribution of the quality
of the network goods.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model. In section 3
we analyze the market equilibrium that determines the private incentives to innovate.
In section 4 we present the socially optimal outcome and compare it with the results of
section 3. Section 4 considers the role of compatibility. Section 5 concludes.
62 The Model
Consider a two-period model of an industry that exhibits network externalities. In period
1 there is an incumbent monopolist, I, that produces a network good associated with
a quality level q1. The incumbent monopolist serves the entire market in this period
and builds an installed base. Between periods 1 and 2, the incumbent can invest in
a potential innovation, which will enable him to achieve, with probability sI, a higher
quality level q2 for the good he produces in period 2. We denote this quality improvement
as q2 −q1 = q∆ > 0. For the cases when the innovation is not achieved, event that occurs
with probability 1 − sI, the incumbent produces in period 2 the same good it produced
in period 1. The cost of this investment increases with the probability of achieving the
innovation and is assumed to be quadratic and given by ks2
I/2, where k is a cost parameter.
Furthermore, we introduce a potential entrant, E, who can also invest in innovation
and enter the market with a network good in period 2. As the incumbent, the cost of the
investment for the entrant is given by ks2
E/2, where sE is the probability that the entrant
develops the innovation and enters the market with a good of quality q2. It is assumed
that in the case that the entrant does not achieve the innovation, event that occurs with
probability 1 − sE, it is able to ”copy” the technology used by the incumbent in period
1. For simplicity, it is assumed that the problem of both ﬁrms reduces to choose the
probability sI and sE that the innovation is achieved in period 2.
On the demand side, it is assumed that each period a group of homogeneous consumer
of size 1 arrives in the market. Given consumer homogeneity, we can assume without
loss of generality that in each period only one consumer arrives in the market. In the
model, each consumer exhibit an inelastic demand for a single unit of a network good and
purchases as soon as he arrives in the market. There is no discounting. In particular, the
per-period utility that a consumer derives from a network good is given by q + bx where
q is the quality of the good (i.e. stand-alone value), and b is the extent of the network
beneﬁt attached to the good given that the number of consumers buying the same good
is x.
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of period 1, the incumbent
produces a network good with quality q1, sets a price and the ﬁrst consumer buys. Between
7periods 1 and 2, the incumbent invests in order to improve its good. At the same time,
a potential entrant invests in order to enter the market with an improved good. At the
beginning of period 2, the outcome of the innovation is realized, price competition takes
place, the new consumer arrives in the market and decides on its preferred good.
3 Market Equilibrium
In order to characterize the subgame-perfect equilibria in this game we proceed backwards.
We start with the pricing and consumption decision in period 2.
3.1 Second Period Sales
In the second period ﬁrms decide on the price they charge, and the second consumer
decides on the good he prefers. However, these two decisions are aﬀected by ﬁrst period
purchases and the outcome of the innovation process. Recall that in period 1 the incum-
bent ﬁrm monopolizes the market and is able to serve it completely. The evolution of
the ﬁrst period is assumed exogenous. Therefore, an installed base of size 1 is built and
carried into the second period. Regarding the innovation process, we distinguish among
four cases; B denotes the case in which both ﬁrms innovate; I and E denote the cases in
which only the incumbent or only the entrant innovates, respectively; and N denotes the
history in which no ﬁrm innovates. We deﬁne four subgames ΓB, ΓI, ΓE and ΓN for each
case, respectively.
In subgame ΓB, both ﬁrm innovate and therefore are able to enter the market with a
good of quality q2. However, given the existence of an installed base, ﬁrms compete in a
quality diﬀerentiated duopoly. It is further assumed that consumers are able to coordinate
on the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Therefore, they compare the maximum surplus that
can be obtained from each technology and decide accordingly.5 Thus, the beneﬁt gross of
price provided by the incumbent is equal to q2 + 2b, and equal to q2 + b for the entrant.
Bertrand competition implies that the incumbent’s price is equal to pI = b and sells to the
second consumer, while the entrant’s price equals pE = 0 and does not enter the market.
5See Katz and Shapiro (1986) and Farrell and Katz (2005).
8In subgame ΓI, the incumbent ﬁrm innovates and sells a good of quality q2 oﬀering a
gross beneﬁt of q2 + 2b, while the entrant provides a surplus of q1 + b. Again, Bertrand
competition implies an incumbent’s price of pI = q∆+b and sells to the second consumer,
while the entrant’s price equals pE = 0 and does not enter the market.
In subgame ΓE, the entrant ﬁrm is the only innovator and sells a good of quality q2
oﬀering a gross beneﬁt of q2+b, while the incumbent provides a surplus of q1+2b. In this
subgame, entry takes place whenever q∆ > b. In that case, Bertrand competition implies
an entrant’s price of pE = q∆ −b and sells to the second consumer, while the incumbent’s
price equals pI = 0.
In subgame ΓN, no ﬁrm innovates and both oﬀer a good of quality q1. However, the
incumbent exhibits an installed base advantage and provides a surplus equal to q1 + 2b,
compared to q1 +b from the entrant. Bertrand competition implies that the incumbent’s
price is equal to pI = b and sells to the second consumer, while the entrant’s price equals
pE = 0 and does not enter the market.
Assumption 1. The value of the innovation is greater than the value of the installed
base. q∆ > b.
This assumption gives the opportunity to the entrant to enter the market. That is,
the value of the innovation should be able to more than compensate the network beneﬁts
provided by the incumbent ﬁrm and drives the result presented for subgame ΓE.
We can summarize the outcome of second period price competition in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. Given assumption 1, each second period subgame-perfect price equilibrium
is unique. No entry takes place in subgames ΓB, ΓI, ΓN, while the entrant overtakes the
market in subgame ΓE. Equilibrium prices are given as follows:
i. In subgames ΓB and ΓN, pI = b and pE = 0.
ii. In subgame ΓI, pI = b + q∆ and pE = 0.
iii. In subgame ΓE, pI = 0 and pE = q∆ − b.
9Proposition 1 implies that entry only occur when subgame ΓE is realized. That is, the
only opportunity for the entrant to enter the market is when it achieves the innovation
and the incumbent does not.
3.2 First Period Investment Decisions
Given the above analysis of the period 2 play, we now solve for the subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the entire game considering the optimal investment behavior of both ﬁrms.
The proﬁt function of the incumbent is therefore given by,
max
sI
sIsEb + sI(1 − sE)(b + q∆) + (1 − sI)(1 − sE)b − ks
2
I/2, (1)
where k is a cost parameter.
Analogously, and following the analysis of the period 2 price competition, the proﬁt
function of the entrant is therefore given by,
max
sE
(1 − sI)sE(q∆ − b) − ks
2
E/2 (2)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for an interior solution are given by,
q∆ − sE(q∆ − b) − ks
∗
I = 0, (3)
for the incumbent ﬁrm, and,
(1 − sI)(q∆ − b) − ks
∗
E = 0, (4)
for the entrant ﬁrm. Note that whenever the probabilities sI and sE are in the interval
(0,1), the second-order conditions are always less than zero and the investment strategies
exhibit strategic substitutability. Therefore, we can ﬁnd the optimal equilibrium levels
by solving simultaneously equations (3) and (4) for the values of sI and sE. That is, the
optimal investment levels are given by,
s
∗
I = 1 −
k(q∆ − k)





(q∆ − b)(q∆ − k)
(q∆ + k − b)(q∆ − k − b)
(6)
We can show the following results.
Proposition 2. Given assumption 1.
i. For k > q∆ there are unique values of s∗
I and s∗
E such that 0 < s∗





ii. For k ≤ q∆ the equilibrium levels of investment are unique and equal to s∗
I = 1 and
s∗
E = 0.
Proof. Numeral [i.] follows from equations (5) and (6). Numeral [ii.] requires to check
the ﬁrst-order conditions (i.e. equations (3) and (4)) and it can be seen that k ≤ q∆
implies a corner solution.
Numeral [i.] of proposition 2 implies that entry occurs with positive probability (i.e
(1−s∗
I)s∗
E) when the cost of innovating, k, is relatively high. The intuition for this result
is that for moderate costs of innovation, the incentives for the incumbent to innovate are
high and therefore achieves the innovation with a high probability. Given that the entrant
can only enter the market when the incumbent does not innovate, the entrant has lower
incentives to innovate. As the cost of the innovation increases, the incumbent reduces his
incentives to innovate and, hence, it is, in expectations, proﬁtable for the entrant to keep
investing. However, the installed base advantage of the incumbent limits the incentives
to innovate for the entrant.
Numeral [ii.] of proposition 2 states that when the cost of innovation is too low no
entry occurs. That is, the incumbent invests its maximum possible amount s∗
I = 1 and
the entrant has no incentives to innovate and exhibit an investment level equal to s∗
E = 0.
These result of proposition 2 can be seen graphically. Figure 1 shows the equilibrium
values s∗
I and s∗
E. For simplicity, this ﬁgure considers the case when b = 1 and q∆ = 3 but
extends to any parameter conﬁguration, such that the assumptions of the model hold.
Note in the graph the case when the cost of investment are zero or close to zero
(i.e. no entry equilibrium due to k ≤ q∆). In that situation, the incentives to invest for
the incumbent are at its maximum (sI = 1) because investing that amount implies the
11Figure 1: Market Outcome - Investment Levels
achievement of an innovation in the next period at a low cost, and therefore, securing
its incumbent position. Conversely, the incentives to invest for the entrant are zero, even
though investment is low or even costless. The reason is, no matter how much the entrant
invests (even sE = 1), the entrant is never going to takeover the market. Therefore, for
costless investment the incumbent ﬁrm invests the maximum possible and the entrant
ﬁrm performs no investment.
However, when the cost of investment starts increasing, it is extremely costly for the
incumbent to carry out exactly the maximum possible investment. Therefore, it reduces
slightly its level of investment, reducing at the same time its probability of success. As a
consequence, now that the incumbent is not achieving the innovation with certainty, there
is a room for the entrant to invest and, possibly, takeover the market. For low cost of
investment and given that the entrant starts with no investment, the increasing possibility
of overtaking the market, when the cost of investment increases, implies that the entrant
also increases its investment level in order to take advantage of such opportunity. Never-
theless, as the cost of the innovation increases, the entrant cannot increase its investment
level indeﬁnitely because at some point investment eﬀorts become too expensive. After
that point, the investment level of the entrant ﬁrm must decrease on the cost of such
investments. Note that it is always the case that s∗
I > s∗
E.
This divergence in the investment levels of the two ﬁrms only arises because of the
12installed base that the incumbent built in period 1. Therefore, the extent of the network
beneﬁt is critical to this result and explains the asymmetric investment levels observed in
equilibrium. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under assumption 1 assume that the network externalities increase (i.e.
b increases). In equilibrium,
i. The incumbent invests more in R&D.
ii. The entrant invests less in R&D.
Proof. Consider the derivative of equations (5) and (6) with respect to the network
externalities parameter.
This proposition says that the presence of network externalities increases the incentives
to innovate for the ﬁrm that exhibits the installed base. That is, the presence of locked-in
consumers implies that successful improvements in the good oﬀered can be proﬁtable.
On the other hand, the presence of installed bases reduces the incentives for the entrant
ﬁrm due to the strategic substitutability with respect to the incumbent’s investment level.
This result is in contrast with those reported by Kristiansen (1996) in his proposition 2,
where higher network beneﬁts imply lower (higher) incumbent’s (entrant’s) incentives to
innovate. One reason for this discrepancy, is due to the fact that the focus of his paper is
on the riskiness associated to the R&D projects undertaken by the ﬁrms, and therefore,
it implies a diﬀerent modeling strategy as explained in the introduction.
The previous results can be seen in Figure 2. This ﬁgure shows that for b = 0 both
ﬁrms exhibit the same incentives to innovate and the size of the diﬀerence depends on the
extent of the network externalities. It can be shown that the level of R&D when b = 0
is symmetric and equal to q∆/(q∆ + k). As b increases, the incentives to innovate behave
according to proposition 3.
In addition, the incentives to innovate are also aﬀected by the size of the expected
innovation. This result is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Assume that the value of the potential innovation increases (i.e. q∆
increases). In equilibrium,
i. The incumbent invests more in R&D.
13Figure 2: Investment Levels and Network Externalities
ii. For low innovation costs the entrant invests less in R&D and the opposite occurs
for moderate and high innovation costs.
Proof. Consider the derivative of equations (5) and (6) with respect to q∆.
Figure 3 shows that for moderate and high cost of the innovation, a higher size of
the innovation tends to increase the incentives to innovate for both ﬁrms. This follows
from the higher expected returns that can be made in the future if the installed base
is increased (or captured) in period 2. This result is in line with the literature on the
incentives to innovate, namely, a higher expected value of being the innovator increases
the willingness to pay for the innovation.6 In contrast, for low cost of innovation, a higher
size of the innovation may reduce the incentives to innovate of the entrant ﬁrm. The
intuition of this result is similar to the one presented for proposition 2. That is, when the
cost of innovating is low, an increase in the size of the innovation increases the innovation
incentives for the incumbent ﬁrm. This could lead the incumbent ﬁrm to carry out an
investment level that is close to the maximum possible, hence, reducing the expected
value of the innovation for the entrant and, in consequence, its innovation incentives.
One important question corresponds to the eﬃciency of the previous results. This
analysis is taken into account in the next section.
6See Reinganum (1989).
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4 Social Optimum
In order to analyze the eﬃciency of the market outcome presented above, this section
analyzes the socially optimal outcome. We try to ﬁnd out what are the diﬀerences in
the privately determined investment behavior for the incumbent and the entrant ﬁrm and
what is the role of network externalities in the potential ineﬃciencies. We ﬁrst assume
that in the second period adoption can be induced by a central planner. Thus, given
the outcome of the innovation process, we are able to determine the network good that
provides the higher surplus from a social perspective. Next, once we know which network
good is going to be induced, we analyze the social incentives to undertake innovative
initiatives. We consider the case where the following assumption holds.
Assumption 2. The value of the innovation is greater than the value of the installed base
of the old and new consumers. q∆ > 2b.
This assumption is required to consider situations where it is socially optimal to in-
troduce a new technology that is incompatible with the existing installed base.
4.1 Second Period Technology Adoption
We consider the maximum surplus that consumers can achieved in the second period given
the four possible subgames (i.e. ΓB, ΓI, ΓE and ΓN). We take into account the surplus
15of the ﬁrst consumer that is locked-in with the incumbent’s good, and the surplus of the
consumer that arrives in the second period.
In subgame ΓB, the social surplus provided by the incumbent’s good is equal to q1+2b
and q2 + 2b for the ﬁrst and second period consumer, respectively. This provides a total
social surplus of q2 + q1 + 4b in the second period if the network good of the incumbent
ﬁrm is adopted. Analogously, the entrant’s good provides a surplus equal to q1 + b and
q2 + b for the ﬁrst and second period consumer, respectively. The total social surplus
from the entrant’s good is q2 + q1 + 2b. Clearly, due to the role of the installed base, the
incumbent’s good provides a higher overall social surplus and therefore is adopted in the
case subgame ΓB is realized.
Following a similar analysis, we can show that in subgames ΓI and ΓN the incumbent’s
technology is induced with total surplus equal to q2 + q1 + 4b and 2q1 + 4b, respectively.
Given assumption 2, in the case that subgame ΓE is realized in the second period, it
is socially optimal to induce the entrant’s technology in the second period. Speciﬁcally,
the entrant’s good provides a total surplus of q2 + q1 + 2b.
Given the optimal choices of the central planner in the second period in terms of
adoption, now we are able to calculate the socially optimal investment behavior. This is
calculated in the next subsection.
4.2 First Period Investment Decisions
The central planner’s objective function considered in the ﬁrst period, given the optimal
choice that is going to be observed in the second period once the innovation process is
realized, is given by,
max
sI,sE
sIsE(q2 + q1 + 4b) + sI(1 − sE)(q2 + q1 + 4b)






In order to express the results in a comparable way with respect to the analysis pre-
sented for the market outcome, it can be shown that adding and subtracting q1, the
16problem of the social planner can be written as,
max
sI,sE
sIsE(4b + q∆) + sI(1 − sE)(4b + q∆)
+ (1 − sI)sE(2b + q∆) + 4b(1 − sI)(1 − sE)






In consequence, the ﬁrst-order conditions are given by,
q∆ − sE(q∆ − 2b) − ks
SO
I = 0, (8)
for the incumbent technology, and,
(1 − sI)(q∆ − 2b) − ks
SO
E = 0, (9)
for the entrant technology.
As in the case for the market outcome, whenever the probabilities sI and sE are in
the interval (0,1), the second-order conditions are always less than zero. Therefore, we
can ﬁnd the social optimal levels by solving simultaneously equations (8) and (9) for the
values of sSO
I and sSO
E . That is, the social optimal investment levels are given by,
s
SO
I = 1 −
k(q∆ − k)





(q∆ − 2b)(q∆ − k)
(q∆ + k − 2b)(q∆ − k − 2b)
(11)
We can show the following results.
Proposition 5. Without network externalities (b = 0) the social optimum and the market
outcome are identical
Proof. Comparing equations (5) and (6) for the market outcome and equations (10) and
(11) for the social optimum, it can be seen that for b = 0 there is no ineﬃciency for any
of the ﬁrms.
17The result in proposition 5 permits us to isolate the impact of network externalities
in the ineﬃciencies that may arise in the incentives to innovate for both ﬁrms.
In addition, by comparing the optimal levels of innovation with the levels achieved
privately, we can state the following result.
Proposition 6. In comparison with the social optimum,
i. The incumbent exhibits a too low level of investment.
ii. The entrant exhibits a too high level of investment.
Proof. It follows from comparing equations (5) and (6) for the market outcome and
equations (10) and (11) for the social optimum for cases where b > 0.
This result states that even though the incumbent has increased incentives to innovate
given the presence of network externalities, those greater incentives are insuﬃcient from
a welfare perspective. The reason for this results comes from the fact that in the market
outcome, the private incentives of the incumbent do not consider the potential loss that
the ﬁrst consumer can incur given that is locked-in. This result is presented in Figure 4.
For the case of the entrant, this result implies that, given that he can capture the
market (i.e. make proﬁts) only if he is the unique innovator, he would over-invest in
R&D. In this way, the entrant ﬁrm maximizes the probability of successful innovation in
a socially ineﬃcient way (i.e. rent dissipation). As stated in the introduction, Kristiansen
(1996) presents the opposite result. That is, a potential entrant under-invests in R&D
because he opts for a too certain R&D project, maximizing the probability of successful
innovation. Therefore, even though the intuition in both cases is similar, the implications
for R&D expenditures are the exact opposite and arise from the modeling strategy. We
believe that in Kristiansen (1996), the assumed mean-preserving spread criterion, although
it allows an analysis of R&D risk, it leads to a unrealistic prediction. In network industries
entrants usually tend to heavily (over) invest in R&D in order to introduce new network
incompatible technologies (e.g. interactive TV, Compact Disk (CD), Digital Versatile
Disk (DVD), and digital imaging).7
7Choi (1994) also presents a model where a potential entrant chooses a too certain R&D project in
order to maximize the expected network size. However, Choi (1994) does not consider the implications
for R&D expenditures that are the focus of the present paper.
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The main implication of the results regarding the social eﬃciency of the market out-
come is that, in equilibrium, the new incompatible technology (i.e. the entrant’s network
good) tend to be adopted too often. Kristiansen (1996) presents the same result. In his
paper, entry occurs too often because the entrant chooses a too certain R&D project,
implying a high rate of success and a too low level of investments. In the present model,
entry occurs too often because the entrant invests too much in R&D and captures the
market too frequently. Therefore, even though his market outcome results diﬀer from the
ones presented here (i.e. he predicts an entrant’s ineﬃcient under-investment level), the
consequences for social welfare are similar.
These results highlight the importance of an empirical analysis aimed at disentangle
the true mechanism behind R&D incentives and the pattern of adoption of network goods.
This is particularly relevant for the design of public policy. For instance, public policies
that increase the incentives to innovate for entrant ﬁrms (i.e. tax exemptions, R&D sub-
sidies, patents’ design, etc.) will imply opposite eﬀects for social welfare. In Kristiansen
(1996), such policies will be welfare-enhancing because they will allow an entrant ﬁrm to
choose a riskier project, invest more and reduce the ineﬃciently high entry rate. In the
present setup, such policies will be welfare-reducing because they will increase the loss
due to the rent dissipation in the R&D competition stage and will exacerbate the already
too high rate of entry.
195 Compatibility
The last two sections dealt with the case when the two ﬁrms produce incompatible network
goods. However, a common observation is the growing number of alliances in information-
technology industries in order to attempt to determine common design features in emerg-
ing markets. Sometimes the alliances take the form of compatibility agreements (e.g.
sharing technologies) in order to maximize network eﬀects.
For instance, a consortium of electronics and computing companies working on DVD
development are attempting to agree on common standards to try to avoid the VHS/Beta
standards battle. IBM decided to open its PC architecture and Nokia announced that it
would share its mobile technology with other ﬁrms.
At the same time, in some recent cases like the video game industry and the intro-
duction of digital TV, it has been clear that competition takes place with incompatible
standards. Moreover, there is no clear answer under which conditions industry competi-
tion favors compatibility or incompatibility. For instance, Phillips and Sony agreed on a
Compact Disk (CD) standard but are now entering a contest to determine the new digital
audio format.8
This section provides an illustration of the role of compatibility in a network market
and its impact on the incentives to perform R&D investments. In the setup presented in
this paper, full compatibility implies that each group of consumers beneﬁt from the total
network eﬀects. That is, additional to the stand-alone value of the network good, the
value of the network beneﬁts is common to all consumers and equal to 4b. Therefore, in
the price competition stage the network beneﬁts provide no advantage to any ﬁrm and
the ﬁrst period R&D market equilibrium is identical to the case without network eﬀects
with optimal investments in R&D symmetric and equal to q∆/(q∆+k) (i.e. a price-quality
competition determined by a R&D race).9
However, what makes the present analysis diﬀerent to a regular R&D race under
quality diﬀerentiation is the impact on consumer surplus. That is, the network beneﬁts
8See Reilly (1993) and Besen and Farrell (1994).
9Under compatibility, the ﬁrms’ problem is deﬁned by maxsi si(1−sj)(q∆)−ks2
i/2 where i,j ∈ {I,E}
and i 6= j. The social planner problem is equal to maxsI,sE sIsE(q∆)+sI(1−sE)(q∆)+(1−sI)sE(q∆)+
(1 − sI)(1 − sE) + 4b + 2q1 − ks2
I/2 − ks2
E/2.
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do not aﬀect the outcome of ﬁrms’ competition and the social planner but do inﬂuence
the ﬁnal surplus enjoyed by consumers. By solving the problem under compatibility it
can be shown that even though industry proﬁts are always higher under incompatibility,
a social planner would always impose a compatibility agreement.
Moreover, under compatibility, private R&D incentives are not only symmetric but
eﬃcient. This result is not surprising because compatibility implies that the network
beneﬁts are common to all groups of consumers, and this fact is known by private ﬁrms,
as well as by the social planner.
However, note that this compatibility-led eﬃciency implies that the incumbent ﬁrm
invests less and the entrant invests more than the levels that would be observed under
incompatibility. Therefore, as the net eﬀect depends on parameters’ values, compatibility
does not necessarily reduces the intensity of the R&D competition as has been suggested
for example by Katz and Ordover (1990) and Kristiansen (1998). In consequence, it can
be stated that compatibility per se does not reduce the pace of innovation in a network
industry.10
The reason for this is the presence of endogenous and uncertain quality diﬀerentiation.
In Kristiansen (1998) the only source of diﬀerentiation (in expectations) between the
incumbent and the potential entrant is the presence of an installed base. Therefore,
10In the 70’s, the US National Bureau of Standards refused to write interface standards for the computer
industry claiming that standards would retard innovation. See Hemenway (1975).
21compatibility eliminates all possible sources of advantages for the competing ﬁrms, while
in our case diﬀerentiation can still be achieved through successful R&D initiatives.11
In our model, it can be shown that for high costs of innovation, compatibility actually
increases the R&D competition intensity, evidencing a higher pace of innovation. Deﬁning
the pace of innovation as the probability of observing a quality improvement in any of
the oﬀered goods (i.e. 1 − x where x is the probability that no ﬁrm innovates), Figure 5
shows this result.
6 Conclusions
In the present paper, we have presented a simpliﬁed two-period duopoly model of compe-
tition with uncertain technological progress in order to determine the private incentives
to innovate and its relation with the social incentives.
We have presented four main results. First, for low cost of innovation entry does not
occur at all and for high cost of innovating, entry occurs with positive probability. This
result highlights the preemptive power of the innovation incentives. That is, for low cost
of innovation the incumbent ﬁrm may increase enough the probability of achieving the
innovation, eliminating the entrant’s incentives to attempt to capture the market.
Second, when entry is possible, the incumbent invests always more than the entrant
and, therefore, there is a high probability that the incumbent maintains its monopoly
position. This result implies, that even though the incumbent has an advantage to keep
monopolizing the market, he is forced to innovate given the threat of entry.
Third, from a welfare perspective, the incumbent invests too little and the entrant
invests too much given the existence of locked-in consumers. That is, neither the incum-
bent ﬁrm nor the entrant takes into account the impact on welfare of the ﬁrst period
consumers and this generates the social suboptimal outcome. These eﬃciency results are
solely due to the presence of network externalities.
Finally, fourth, by choosing to produce compatible products, ﬁrms do not necessarily
reduce the R&D competition intensity as has been argued for example in Katz and Or-
11Farrell and Katz (1998) also argue that R&D competition with uncertain outcomes tends to create
winners and losers. Winners prefer incompatibility.
22dover (1990) and Kristiansen (1998). This is due to the presence of endogenous quality
diﬀerentiation. Moreover, compatibility is always preferred from a social welfare perspec-
tive and for high cost of innovation it may even increase the pace of innovation observed
in the industry.
It should be recognized that the model might, and should, be extended to a fully
dynamic setting and must consider a richer set of options for the involved ﬁrms. In
addition, comparisons with case studies or empirical regularities might enrich the results.
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